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IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE STATE OF UTAH
WESTERN CONTRACTING
CORPORATION, a Corporation,
Plaintiff,
-vs.STATE TAX COMMISSION
OF UTAH,
Defendant.

)
Case
No.10322

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This case involves a corporation franchise tax deficiency assessment proposed against the Western Contracting Corporation by the defendant for the year 1962,
in the total amount of $32,913.59.
DISPOSITION BEFORE THE STATE
TAX COMMISSION
A formal hearing was held before a lawfully constituted quorum of the State Tax Commission on September 21, 1964, upon petition and notice as required by
law. As a result of this hearing, the commission sustained the aforementioned deficiency, thereby imposing
liability for the tax upon the plaintiff.
]

RELIEF SOUGHT ON REVIEW
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the decision of the tax com
mission and remand with directions as to the manner ancl
basis of assessment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Western Contracting Corporation, the plaintiff, is an
Iowa corporation duly qualified to transact business in
the State of Utah. The plaintiff is engaged in the construction business as a general contractor and engages
in such projects as dredging rivers, building bridges and
constructing airport facilities. In Utah plaintiff strips
overburden or earth from the Kennecott Copper Company's Bingham Mine.
During the year 1962 plaintiff performed general
contracting ··work in eight different states. Severe losses
resulted from some of the foreign state projects. Most
of the losses resulted from dredging operations requiring specialized equipme::i.t in order to perform the particular project involved_
Project revenues and costs relating to specific contracts or projects closed in 1962 and the resulting net
profit or loss are set forth in the following tables:
CONTRACTS CLOSED DURING YEAR
Project Revenue

Direct Cost

Union-Lincoln
County ______________________ $9,014,197 .87

$7,295,903.22

Kennecott StrippingStage III __________________ 6,144,875.00

3,788,784.62

2

Lake St. Clair
Dredging -------------- 3,07 4,773.52

1,654,262.52

Erie Harbor Dredging 1,307,740.18

834,484.54

Ashland Harbor
Dredging ------------------

768,814.60

616,513.66

Stapleton Air Field ____ 3,529,804.85

3,376,262.23

Delaware River
Dredging ------------------ 1,976,958.50

2,170,581.54

l\Iississippi Gulf
Dredging ------------------ 1,573,000.00

3,006,491.34

Hudson River
Dredging ------------------ 1,418,994.50

1,739,547.38

Floyd Ri\-er Bridges__

440,520.51

401,882.39

CONTRACTS CLOSED DURING YEAR
Allocated
Administrative
Expenses

Net Profit

Union-Lincoln
County ____________________ $1,285,123.7 4 $ 433,170.91
Kennecott StrippingStage III _______________ _ 614,608.24

1,741,237.43

Lake St. Clair
Dredging _______________ _ 291,022.27

1,129,488.73

Erie Harbor
Dredging _______________ _ 146,605.20

326,650.44

Ashland Harbor
Dredging _______________ _ 108,531.61

43,769.33

Stapleton Air Field __

593,860.47

( 440,317 .85)

Delaware River
Dredging ----------------

381,611.15

( 575,234.19)
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Mississippi Gulf
Dredging ----------------

528,653.98

(1,962,145.32)

Hudson River
Dredging ----------------

305,901.60

( 626,454.48)

Floyd River Bridges

70,458.02

(31,819.90)

If the net income from its Utah contract is excluded I
plaintiff received $23,104,804.53 in total project revenue
on jobs or projects closed in 1962. Total project costs
and allocated administrative expenses on all projects
closed in 1962, excluding the Kennecott project, were
$24,806,696.86, resulting in an over-all net loss on projects closed in 1962 of $1, 702,892.33, if the Kennecott
project is excluded.
As reflected above, the gross project revenue or receipts to plaintiff from its Utah operations from contracts completed in 1962 were $6,144,875.00. It was stipulated that on a segregated accounting basis, after deducting applicable expenses, that the net profit before
federal taxes to be allocated to the Utah contract is the
sum of $1, 741,237.43.
Section 59-13-22, U.C.A. 1953, together with Section
59-13-15, U.C.A. 1953, requires the filing of franchise tax
returns on an accrual or percentage of completion basis.
However, the nature of the accounting procedure used
in connection with contracts of more than one year's
duration, such as the taxpayer's Kennecott contract, ii
such that the contract costs to be set off against contract
receipts cannot be conveniently ascertained until coropletion of the contract. Because of this fact, it is difficult
4

for plaintiff to file returns on a percentage of completion
basis.

In addition the plaintiff's records are maintained on
a completed contract basis and its federal tax returns are
prepared on such a basis.
To alleviate the burden of annual payment on corporations so maintaining their records, the tax commis~ion adopted a policy in 1944 requiring segregated accounting for contractors. As part of this administrative policy, income of all contractors was required to be
computed and reported on a percentage of job completion
or eomplete accrual basis. This requirement has been
auhered to unless a contractor requests otherwise and
agrees to file on a completed contract basis, using segregated accounting. This policy was subsequently promnlgatecl as Corporation Franchise Tax Regulation No.
8 by the commission (R. 87).

In 1962 the plaintiff expressed its willingness to
comply with the regulation of the commission and formally agreed to report its income on a completed contract and segregated accounting business basis (R.17-18).
The plaintiff thereafter filed its Utah franchise tax
return for 1962 using the segregated accounting method.
It allocated a net income of $1,741,237.43 to Utah from
its stripping contract with Kennecott Copper Corporation. Plaintiff's total income before federal taxes for the
year 1962 was $555,088.31. After deducting investment
5

credit of $86,071.71 it paid federal income taxes in tlie
a.mount of $183,215.11 resulting in a total net income tr1
plaintiff of $371,873.20 after federal taxes.
For Utah franchise tax purposes, however, the plaiu
tiff allocated the computed sum of $905,443.46 in fedmi
taxes against the actual income from the Utah job. Thus,
while it only paid $183,215.11 in actual federal taxes, it
claims the right to deduct the federal taxes it would 01n
if doing business in Utah alone after an income of
$1, 741,237.43.

The auditing division proposed an additional assessment of $32,913.59 based primarily on the disallowanre
of most of the f edera.l income taxes deducted on the
return.

I~

The plaintiff now claims that its Utah income shonlcl
be taxed pursuant to the allocation formula. set forth in
Section 59-13-20, U.C.A. 1953, and not on a segregated
accounting basis. It further contends that the commission's right to tax its segregated income is limited to its
"net income" as defined by statute. It is also argueil
that if the commission determines that segregated accounting is proper, a projected federal income tax deduction must be allowed.

I

~
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~

I

!

I
I

I
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I
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ARGUMENT

POINT I
THE PLAINTIFF'S UTAH INCOME IS SEPARABLE FROM ITS FOREIGN INCOME AND
MAY BE TAXED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY THIS
STATE.
The Utah franchise tax is a privilege tax on the
right to do business in this state measured by net income. Income derived from business done outside the
state cannot be included in the tax. American Investment CnrJJ. v. State Tax Commission, 101 Utah 189, 120
P. 2c1 ;331; J. M. & M. S. Browning Co. v. State Tax Commissiou, 107 Utah 457, 154 P. 2c1 993. In other words the
-rnlne of the franchise for tax purposes is based on inrome attributable to business done ·within this state. Such
fnrnehise or prfrilege is taxed at a rate of 4 per cent of
the corporation's net income" allocated to this state ... "
59-13-3, U.C.A. 1953 (emphasis suyiplied).
The tax is imposed upon the portion of a multistate corporation's net income assignable or allocable to
businesR done 'vithin this state. See 59-13-20, U.C.A.
1953. This statute provides for an allocation formula
designed to determine the portion of the taxpayer's business taxable by this state. The section further provides:
"(8) If in the judgment of the tax commission
the application of the foregoing rules does not
allocate to this state the proportion of net income
fairly and equitably attributable to this state, it
may with such information as it may be able to
obtain make such allocation as is fairly calcula.ted
to assign to this state the portion of net income

7

reasonably attributable to the business done
within this state and to avoid subjecting the tax.
payer to double taxation." (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus the manifest intention of the Utah Legislature
is to impose the franchise tax upon that portion of cor.
porate net income attributable to business done within
this state.
It is clear that no state may tax any subject oi;er
which it has no jurisdiction. However, it is equally
well established that a state may tax that portion of a
multi-state corporation's income which is derived from
sources or activities within its boundaries. Shaff er v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37, 40 S. Ct. 221, 64 L. Ed. 445; United
States Glue Co. v. Town of Oak Creek, 247 U.S. 321,
38 S. Ct. 499, 62 L. Ed. 1135.

No state may impose a tax which burdens interstate
commerce. Gwen, White & Prince v. H enneford, 305 U.S.
434, 59 S. Ct. 325, 83 L. Ed. 272. Double taxation may
create an unfair burden on interstate commerce violative of the commerce clause. Adams Manufacturing Co.
v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307, 58 S. Ct. 913, 82 L.Ed. 1365
·while the taxpayer herein does not claim constitutional violations, these constitutional provisions explain
the reason for Utah legislative insistence that only income attributable to Utah business activities be taxeLl.
The absence of some apportionment rule can lead to constitutional objections. Therefore, where the source of
income crosses state lines, some rule of apportionment
8

muRt be used by taxing authorities lest a tax on unapportioned multi-state income be declared invalid. Such
a formula for apportionment is provided by 59-13-20(6),
F.C.A. 195:3.
In the present case the income sought to be taxed
(loC's not cross state lines. It is entirely attributable to
the tax payer's activities in Utah.

"Such income, under the principles stated, could be
segregated and taxed in its entirety by the state .... The
same, it would follow, is true of income derived from
personal services wholly performed within the state. It
is only the income derived from a source which crosses
state lines, such as business operations extending into
more than one state, to which the rule of apportionment must be applied." Allocation of Income in State
Tarntio11, Altman & Keesling, C.C.H. 1946. See also Indiaua Y. Ingram-Richardson Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 252, 61
S. Ct. 866, 85 L. Ed. 1313.
If the use of an otherwise permissible formula produces an obviously unreasonable result, and it is possible
to sbow with fair accuracy by separate accounting the
income attributable to a state, application of the formula
is not required. Hans Rees Sons Inc. v. North Carolina,
~83 U.S. 123, 51 S. Ct. 385, 75 L. Ed. 904.

Even though the income of a business is derived
partly from \Yithin and partly from without a taxing
state. :m allocation to that state of a portion of the total
income, as the basis for computing state income tax,
is not ordinarily proper where the business transacted
9

within the state is separable from that transacted outside the state. The business within the taxing state lrn~
been held to be separable, so as to make an allocation
improper, in a number of cases. See Annotation 130
A.L.R. 1205.
These cases include those of Piedmont & Am. R. Co.
v. Query, 56 F. 2d 172, where a South Carolina corporation owned two entirely disconnected railroad lines, one
in South Carolina and the other in North Carolina. The
corporation paid income tax to South Carolina on the
entire net income of the South Carolina line but paid no
tax on the income of the North Carolina line. South
Carolina taxing authorities attempted to use an apportionment formula to reach income from the foreign line,
and the federal court held for the railroad on the ground
that income from the interstate business of the t'WO lines
was readily separable and that the allocation statute was
not intended to apply to such a situation. The court
said:
''We do not think that a proper construction of
the statute requires that the formula be applied
in such a case. The whole spirit of the act negatives the intention to tax income earned beyond
the limits of the state, which would result from
applying the formula to a case such as this.''
The case of Fisher v. Standard Oil Co., 12 F. 2d 744,
involved a foreign corporation doing business in North
Dakota by selling petroleum products which it produced
and refined wholly outside the state. There, also, North
Dakota taxing authorities attempted to allocate the cor10

poration 's business under a formula so as to reach outof-state business activity. The court there said:
''The theories of allocation can have no place
in the inquiry, if net income within the state
stands on its own footing unmixed with outside
business .... We think it cannot be doubted that
the products as brought into this state had an
easily ascertainable wholesale market price. We
think appellee's business within the state is easily
separable from its other business by charging it
with the wholesale price of products which it sells
in North Dakota. That would put it on an equality there with those who sell and do not produce
and refine.''
Another similar case was that of Standard Oil Co. v.
Tlrnresen, 29 F. 2d 708, which involved the same corporation but a later North Dakota statute which provided for
the albeaiion to the state of such portion of the corporation's total income as its tangible property in business bore to its total tangible property in business out~ide the state. The state thereupon contended that the
corporation's business should be regarded as a unit in
the production, refining, distribution and marketing of
oil. But the court refused to accept the state's position.

In the case of Starndard Oil Co. v. Wisconsin Tax
Commission, 197 Wis. 630, 223 N.W. 85, a foreign corporation was engaged in the business of producing, refining,
transporting, and marketing petroleum products. Its
property in Wisconsin consisted largely of tanks in filling
stations, and the corporation did no producing or refining in the state. The Wisconsin income tax statute pro11

vided that ''persons engaged in business within and without the state" should "be taxed only on such income ao
is derived from business transacted and property located
within the state," that "the amount of such income apportionable to Wisconsin may be determined by an alli1ca tion and separate accounting thereof, when, in the judgment of the tax commission, that method ·will reasonably
reflect the income properly assignable to this state," but
that otherwise such income should be determined hy
allocating to vVisconsin a portion of the total income
based upon a formula. The tax commission assessed the
tax computed by the use of the allocation formula, lint
the corporation contended that its income should be
ascertained by the allocation and separate accounting
method by which the ·Wisconsin business was charged at
the market price with all products received by it. The
court sustained the corporation's contention and said:
''There are some operations which from their
very nature produce an income which cannot he
properly allocated by separate accounting methods, instances of which are the telegraph, telephone, and express companies. They stand read~
to serve whosoever may apply for service and the
entire operation constitutes a unit of service. That
is not the case with the manufacturing and sales
business, particularly so \vhen the accounts ~re
so kept as to he readily separable ... We perce11e
no reason why under the facts of this case, the
profits derived from the sales operations should
not be ascertained insofar as plaintiff is concenwd
as they would be if the sales operations were conducted by a separate corporate entity."

12

l\Iost state tax statutes provided a method or formula for allocating interstate income of a multi-state business. Such allocation is appropriate only where the business within the state is not separable. However, these
statutes usually do not require the utilization of an alloeation formula where the statutory method would operate inequitably or fails to achieve its purpose under the
('ircumstances. (For cases and statutes see 130 A.L.R.
1207 --- 1'umota tiou State Income Tax on Business in
Other States.)
So, in Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. State Tax Com111ission, 145 Kan. 715, 68 P. 2d 1, a statute provided that
in case allocation according to the statutory method was
impractical or inequitable, so as to work an undue hard~hip upon the taxpayer, or in case the factors necessary
for an allocation according to the statutory method could
not be ascertained from the taxpayer's records, the tax11ayer should, subject to the approval of the tax commission, allocate a fair part of its total income to the
state by some other method. This case further held that
the determination of whether or not the sratutory method
of allocation should be used is ordinarily an administratin~ cluty of the officers charged with the administration
of the tax lavvs. A district court should not be allowed
to substitute its judgment for that of the tax commission
and make an independent determination of the proper
method of allocation of income.
rrlie case of Montgomery vVard & Co. v. State Tax

Commission, 151 Kan. 159, 98 P. 2d 143, involved a for13

eign corporation operating over 500 retail stores, a part
of which were located in Kansas. All merchandise sold
in the Kansas stores were bought through the corpora.
tion 's offices outside the state, and the business of the
stores was administered and supervised through that
office. A net income for the Kansas stores was arrired
at by deducting from all their gross receipts expenses
directly connected with the Kansas business and a prorata share of the cost of purchasing, handling, and supervisory activities carried on outside the state. The
Kansas Tax Commission attempted to impose a tax
on this entire "net income,'' but the corporation on its
returns made an allocation of this income between Kansas and the states in which the purchasing and supervisory activities were carried on.
The court pointed out that the taxpayer's Kansas
income was segregated by direct accounting in that case,
so that there was no question of allocation of its total
income within and without the state, and both the statute
providing a specific method of allocation and that providing for the use of some other method where the
statutory method was impractical or inequitable were
inapplicable. The court held the taxpayer entitled to a
judicial review of the commission's refusal to permit an
allocation of its Kansas income, where its method of accounting was shown on its returns.
The Utah case of Kennecott Copper Co. v. State
Tax Commission, 18 Utah 140, 221 P. 2d 857, appears to
be controlling. There the taxpayer engaged in certain
14

mining activities in the State of Utah. Mill concentrates were shipped outside the state for processing and
tlic refined products sold outside the state by a wholly
rnrnerl sulJsidiary of the taxpayer.
A separate accounting system was maintained for
the Utah Copper division, but the franchise tax for the
>'ears prior to the controversy had been based on a speeial allocation formula obtained by agreement between
the parties. Kennecott thereafter attempted to change
its reporting and determine the net income assignable
to the state by pooling income from all of its divisons and
then applyng- the formula prescribed by the statute. It
asserted that it was an "indivisible" or unitary business.
Sec 118 Utah, pp. 143, 147. The tax commission refused
to allow the change. The court said:
''\Ve see no good reason for reversing the
State Tax Commission on this ruling and see
many practical difficulties had a different method
been permitted. In some instances the actual net
income to be allocated to business transacted in
this state cannot be fixed with certainty so the legislature set up one method and then clothed the
Commission with the power to permit selection of
another method if it would more accurately reflect
the true net income ... Kennecott's books are kept
on the basis used bv the Commission in determining the deficiency a~d must of necessity be so kept
... The franchise tax reports filed ... were based
on the prescribed system aside from certain contested items [and] they suggest a fair and equitable means of determining the tax liability....
To use the method [requested by the taxpayer]
might introduce variable factors, some impossible
to ascertainment .... In addition it might unjustly

15

discriminate against this state or the taxpayer
in that the tax assessed might bear no reasonable
relationship to ... the amount of business done in
this state." 118 Utah, p. 149.
The court concluded:

"The problem that concerns us here is not that
the Commission seeks to force the taxpayer to a
non-statutory basis. On the contrary, the Com.
mission has permitted the taxpayer to file on a
basis selected by it which the taxpayer seeks to
change because the amount of tax has become
onerous. Such a request may be entirely legitimate but when as here there are factors which
cannot be determined with any degree of satisfaction, the request is made some six years after
the tax has accrued and the only reason assigned
is that the change may substantially reduce the
tax liability, the showing is not sufficient to convince us that the Commission was arbitrary and
capricious in denying the request.'' Ibid, p. 151.

It appears therefore that resort to the formula established by Section 59-13-20(6), U.C.A. 1953, is improper
unless the income sought to be taxed by the State of
Utah is attributable to two or more states. This is because a precise allocation of income may not be possible
in such instances.

Many types of income, however, can be specifically
allocated or determined without resort to a formula. 111
such cases the taxing state is justified in disregarding
the formula and proceeding to tax the actual or real
income attributable to business done or income derived
from sources within its borders.
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'l'heories of allocation have no place in determining
ineome tax on a corporation if net income within a state
ran be distinguished from outside business. Fisher v.
Sfondard Oil (8 Cir.) 12 F. 2d 744.
If the taxpayer's business within the state is separ-

able from his other business outside the state, no allocation nuder the income tax statutes is necessary in order
to dekrmine the amount of tax to be paid. 85 C.J.S.,
7'a1.J·atirm, § 1103; Mexican Petroleum Corp. of Georgia v.
Head, 64 Ga. App. 529, 13 S.E. 2d 887; Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm., 121 P. 2d 1008, 190
Okla.172; Texas Co. v. Cooper, 107 So. 2d 676, 236 La.
380; McWilliams Dredging Co. v. McKeigney, 227 Miss.
/::JO, 86 So. 2d 672, app. dism. 352 U.S. 807, 77 S. Ct. 57,
1 L. Ed. 2d 38.
Separate accounting on a completed job basis is a
prerise record of income attributable to a state. 1 It is a
complete rerord of sales, costs and expenses resulting
from business done within the state. In the present case
the taxpayer's business activities are clearly separable
and suhject to separate accounting. The plaintiff kept
its books and rerords of its Utah contract separate from
those of its other business activities. It filed its Utah
franchise tax returns on a segregated accounting basis.

As the portion of plaintiff's income attributable
to its Utah activities is clearly reflected in its records
and tax returns, such income is taxable without reference
1

A complete discussion of separate accounting as related to the allocation
of business income is found in Allocation of Income in State Taxation,
Altman & Keesling, pp. 89·97, 1946 C.C.H.
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to the formula provided by Section 59-13-20(6), U.C.A
1953. Only where income cannot be ascertained should
the allocation formula be used.
POINT II

THE TAXPAYER DOES NOT CONDUCT A
UNITARY BUSINESS.
The taxpayer contends that it is a unitary business
and therefore is not capable of specifically accounting
for its income. This contention is in direct conflict
with the 1962 agreement signed by the taxpayer. It also
contradicts the returns and records of the taxpayer which
are maintained and filed on a segregated basis.
A business is unitary ''if business done in any state
benefits the business done elsewhere and is benefited by
the business done elsewhere because of the distribution
of processes and operations, centralized management, increased buying power, volume reduction of manufacturing cost, or other factors of the business as a unit.
Altman & Keesling, Allocation of Income in State Ta:rar
tion, p. 38. If the business is of such character, income
apportionment by formula may be required except where
the result is obviously unreasonable in a particular case.
Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501, 62 S. Ct. 701.
The Utah Franchise Tax Statutes provide for the
taxation of foreign corporations doing business in this
state. The extent of Utah's power to tax is limited to
income from sources within the state. Where income of
a corporation is derived from sources partly within and
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partly without a taxi11g state and ·where the business is
nnitar)· in the sense that husi1wss transacted within the
state is i10t separahle from that transacted outside the
statP, taxation of the income of such a corporation is
c·oHtrollPd hy the Commerre Clause of the Federal Constitution. In this situation most state statutes provide
for an alloration to the taxing state of a portion of the
total inC'ome of suC'h a business. Surh statutes are constitutional. Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37, 40 S. Ct. 221,
64 L. Eel. 445; Travis v. Yale & T. Mfg. Co., 252 U.S. 60,
40 R. Ct. 228, 54 L. Ed. 460.
Such statutes generally provide methods or formuhie i'or <1llorati11g to the taxing state a share of the total
inrome of a multi-state business where the business in
the state is not separable. Often they permit the use of
alternate methods if inequities result from a statutory
formula. ]fatso11 Nar. Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 297 U.S. 441, 56 S. Ct. 553, 80 L. Ed. 791.
These alloration statutes are intended to prevent
dot1lil<~ taxation resulting from the impoRition of state
taxes upon inrome crossing state lines. But even where
ineome of a lmsinC'ss is derived partly from within and
partly from without a taxing state, formula allocation
of inrome is not proper where the business transacted
within the state is separable from that transacted without. Fisher v. Standard Oil Co., (C.C.A. 8th) 12 F. 2d
i44.

It is well established that the unitary nature of a
h11si1lC'ss is dependent upon the manner in which the
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business is conducted. Crawford Manufacturing Co. 1,
State Commission of Revenue and Taxation, 180 Kan.
352, 304 P. 2d 504. In that case the court concluded that
the question of the unitary nature of a business was a
mixed question of law and fact properly within the jurisdiction of the fact-finding state commission. The court,
however, cited Altman & Keesling, Allocation of Income
in State Taxation, 1946, p. 100, as follo·ws:
"The authorities, we believe, preponderate in
holding that the direct or separate accounting
method may not be properly employed to determine the amount of income earned in the particnlar state ·where it ·was derived from a unitars
business. Instead, the factor formula should he
employed, thus giving weight to the different fartors responsible for earning the income so as to
apportion it from the entire business among the
states in which it was earned."
The taxpayer herein seeks to utilize a claim of unitary business operations to avoid the separate reporting
of its Utah business activities. The rule stated above does
not apply, however.
'' ... Where the business within the state is
truly separate and distinct from the business without the state, this segregation can be made fairly,
easily and accurately, and, accordingly, the separate accounting method may properly be use~.
Where, however, the business within the state 1~
not a separate business but is an integral part of
a unitary business carried on within and witho~t
the state, difficulties will be encountered both in
the segregation of the gross income attributable
to the state and in the segregation of the expenses
attributable to the state and in the segregation of
the expenses attributable thereto .... Op. cit, p. 90.
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Even a finding that a business is unitary, however,
has been held not to preclude state taxation of various
aspects of its intrastate activity.
In the case of Hans Rees' Sons v. North Carolina
'
283 U.S. 123, 51 S. Ct. 385, 75 L. Ed. 879, the taxpayer
was engaged in the business of tanning, manufacturing
and selling leather products. The principal manufac(uring and supply house was located in North Carolina.
Sales were made throughout the United States, and the
question of a proper apportionment formula was at
rnsue. The court said:
"The difficulty of making an exact apportionment is apparent, and hence, when the state has
adopted a method not intrinsically arbitrary, it
will be sustained until proof is offered of an unreasonable and arbitrary application in particular cases. But the fact that the corporate enterprise is a unitary one, in the sense that the ultimate gain is derived from the entire business, does
not mean that for the purpose of taxation the activities which are conducted in different jurisdictions are to be regarded as 'component parts of a
single unit' so that the entire net income may be
taxed in one state regardless of the extent to
which it may be derived from the conduct of the
enterprise in another state." 283 U.S. p.133.
A recent Louisiana case involved a claimed unitary
business under a fact situation not wholly dissimilar to
the instant matter. In Texas Co. v. Cooper, 236 La. 380,
107 So. 2d 676, the Texas Company, conducting operations on a world-·wide scale, produced crude oil in Louisi-
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ana. Its oil refineries and asphalt plants were operated
outside that state, but a significant portion of its crude
oil production was in Louisiana. The State Collector
of Revenue required the taxpayer to report his income
by a separate accounting method, which was contested by
the taxpayer, who argued that the statutory apportion.
ment formula method should be used. The taxpayer
argued that the collector did not possess the statutory
power to require its income to be determined by a separate accounting method, and that if such attempts were
made, the federal constitution was offended. Louisiana
statutes defined the manner in which the net income
eanied by a foreign corporation from sources within the
state was to be determined and prescribed two methods
of determining the amount of income tax to be paid to
the state. They were a separate accounting method and
an apportionment method. The statute provided:
"Where the collector finds that the use of the
apportionment method by the taxpayer produces
a manifestly unfair result and that the separate
accounting method would more equitably determine the amount of net income derived from
sources in Louisiana, he may require that the
separate accounting method be used in such case."
L. S. A. - R. S. 42 :244.
The Texas Company produced about 30,000,000 barrels of crude oil in Louisiana, which was co-mingled with
company-produced oil and sold either to purchasers in
Louisiana or transported out of the state to company
refineries. The company filed its 1950 income tax returns
and paid its tax for that year by the apportionment
22

method, which resulted in a tax of $58,336.35. The collector calculated a tax deficiency in the amount of $468,398.49, which in large measure was based on his separate
accounting theory. The taxpayer argued that it was
impossible and inequitable to attribute any direct profit
to its Louisiana production operations, since, due to the
unitary nature of its world-wide operations, each stage
of the product's progress from production through refining to distribution to ultimate marketing was so interdependent that only the final gain or loss could be considered realized without identification of a particular
process as the source of any part of eventual profit or
loss. The court, adopting the trial court's decision,
stated:
''In the first place, counsel for plaintiff has not
favored the court with any judicial decree holding
that corporations engaged in the petroleum industry are unitary in character. To the contrary
... the collector cites the following cases which
in each instance upheld the taxpayer's (oil company) contention to the effect that company operations similar to those of the present taxpayer
yere not so unitary in nature that the company
was precluded from using the separate accounting method to determine intrastate profits as
against the taxing authority's attempts to utilize
he apportionment method of fixing the taxpayer's
share of income attributable to the taxing states
respectively: Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, 1941, 190 Okla. 172, 121 P.
2d 1008; Standard Oil Co. v. Wisconsin Tax Commission, 1929, 197 Wis. 632, 23 N.W. 85; Standard
Oil Co., Indiana v. Thoresen, Tax Commissioner,
etc., 8th Cir., 1928, 29 F. 2d 708; Fisher v. Standard Oil Co., 8th Cir., 1926, 12 F. 2d 744, Ibid, p.
681 and footnote therein.''
23

The court continued:
" ... Louisiana, having the right to collect a
tax imposed on 11et income, has the right to determine what that right is in relation to the business
transacted ·within the state if that can be clone
fairly aml equitably even though the net income
by that separate accounting method is more than
what would be the state's aliquot portion of the
earnings based on the statutorv formula of apportionment of the nation wide ~perations."
*
'' *
"The fact that the plaintiff can make a unit
accounting of every step of its operations from the
moment the crude oil comes to the surface until
the sale of the refined product in all parts of the
world convinces me that if there is a profit in the
oil above the cost of production or purchase in
Louisiana the margin of profit can he determiner]
by an expert accountant as of the moment the oil
leaves the state. An example of a unitary bu8iness where it would seem to be impossible to make
a separate accounting of income -within the boundaries of a state would be an express company, a
telephone or telegraph company, in which the
whole operation 'constitutes but a single plan,
made so by the very character and necessities of
the business.' ''
"Plaintiff contends that it is not possible from
an accounting standpoint to determine the net income from its transactions in Louisiana by the
separate accounting method. Not only does plaintiff actually use that method in those states whe~·e
it wants to use it, but it appears to me that in
Louisiana in order to find the arithmetical ratios
which constitute the statutory formula used in the
apportionment method, it is absolutely necessary
to keep an account of and show the separate values
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and amounts of the property, payrolls and sales
of this plaintiff's business transacted in Louisiana
which are fundamental steps and basic informa~
tion for a separate accounting. It is inconsistent
to say that a separate accounting cannot be made
when the apportionment formula cannot be known
without a separation of the principal items of the
Louisiana transaction used in determining net
income."
The court then cited Altman & Keesling, Allocation
of lnco1ne in 8tate Taxation (2d ed. 1950), as follows:
''Thus, in this field, as in many other fields, the
ideal cannot be obtained. Something less than perfection must suffice.''
The court continued:
"I see no reason why the separate accounting
method applied to the oil gathering operation
should not be as accurate as plain bookkeeping
can and should be. While there is no testimony on
the subject I can perceive more difficulty or inaccuracy when the separate method is applied to
sales of the refined products brought into the
state. . . . "
Altman & Keesling's book, Allocation of Income in
State Taxation ( 2d ed. 1950), was cited as follows:
"\Vhere the bnsiness within a state is truly
separate and distinct from the business without
the state this segregation can be made fairly,
(>asily and accurately, and, accordingly, the separate accounting method may properly be used."
The court continued:
"vVhere the business within the state is not
separate, but is an integral part of a unitary busi-
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ness carried on within and without the state, difficulties
will be encountered in cleterminino·
the
.
~
rncome and expenses attributable to the state, anrl
the principal objection to the apportionment methorl is that it is apt to be arbitrary and to represent
merely the opinion of the taxpayer, which may he
biased_ Therefore, if the Texas Company hu~i
ness is a unit from beginning to end and the
Louisiana transactions cannot be separated to
determine the net income from them, then that is
all there is to this case and judgment \Yould haYe
to be for plaintiff as prayed for. The CYidcnce in
this case convinces me that a separate accounti11g
of the Louisiana operations can properly he applied to determine the Louisiana net income. It
is done by this plaintiff in other states where its
operations are exactly the same as here and the
collector has demonstrated that it can and should
he done in Louisiana.''
The court made reference to a requirement imposing
upon the collector the burden of showing that the apportionment method produced ''a manifestly unfair result."
The court said :
"The term 'manifestly unfair result' has an
obvious meaning in the context of its statuton·
setting ... [This] demonstrates to us the legislative intent that the 'manifestly unfair result'
ref erred to is a manifestly inaccurate representation through the apportionment method of income derived from within Louisiana, so that the
separate accounting method more equitably determines the amount of the net income attributable
to Louisiana operations.
' ' This standard is applicable both to the taxpayer and to the collector.''
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The court concluded:
''The apportionment method produces a manifestly unfair rsult, and the separate accounting
method more equitably determines the income
derived from Louisiana sources, not because the
tax liability is greater by the latter method, but
because the separate accounting method assigns
a value properly attributable to the Louisiana
production operations of the taxpayer by includ~
ing within the measure of the tax the value of the
oil produced by such production operations,
whereas the apportionment formula in computing
state tax liability does not take into account the
value of such operations insofar as singularly attributable to this state wherein are produced approximately 30,000,000 of the 100,000,000 barrels
of oil ·which constitute the world-wide production
of the taxpayer.
''A domestic producer identically situated with
the appellant which sold its product at the market value would report a net income based upon
the gross price or value of the oil produced, less
the expenses of production. The separate accounting method requires the taxpayer to determine its net profit from Louisiana production operations on the same basis. Ibid. p. 690."
The 1956 case of 1lfcWilliams Dredging Co. v. McKeigny, 227 Miss. 730, 86 So. 2d 672, app. dism. 352 U.S.
807, 77 S. Ct. 57, 1 L. Ed. 38, is directly controlling. There,
the taxpayer, an Illinois corporation, was engaged in the
performance of dredging contracts. Certain projects
were performed entirely within the State of Mississippi.
ln addition it conducted crossing repairs between Mississippi and Louisiana and had other projects in Illinois,
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Louisiana and Texas. It reported income from these
projects to Mississippi under an apportionment formula.
The Mississippi Tax Commission set up schedules basinob
a proposed tax assessment upon receipts from the dredging contracts in Mississippi less certain prorated co 11 _
tract costs. The Commission justified its methou of
assessment in the following words: ''It is believed we
can prove that you, of necessity, must determine the
probable cost of any contract performed at any time
in order to bid. Having done so, it would be the height
of folly not to maintain an accounting system which
would tell you whether or not yon had erred in arriving
at your bid ... "
The taxpayer contended that its business was a m1itary operation in that its component parts ·were so close!)·
connected and necessary to each other that the business
could not be divided into separate units for state income
tax purposes and that therefore the Commission's assessment was improper.
The court after citing the applicable statute and
regulations said :
''Our law unquestionably favors the specific
accounting by foreign corporations . . . . It has
been well said that 'theories of allocation have no
place in determining income tax on c?r.f:lora'.ions,
if net income within the state can be d1stmgmshed
from outside business.' Magnolia Petroleum Co.
v. Oklahoma Tax Comm., 190 Okla. 172, 121 P. 2d
1008, 1011.''
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The court continued:
''In the case here the tax commission did not
seek to have a formula upheld. It contended that
specific accounting should and could be made.
It rejected the company's formula. Consequently
the burden was on the company to show that its
extra-territorial values were being taxed or affected. It cannot complain unless it can show that
the Commission's method was arbitrary and unreasonable. Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton, Ltd. v. State
Tax Commission, 266 U.S. 271, 45 S. Ct. 82, 59
L. Ed. 282.
''As has been stated, the formula, upon which
the Company based its returns, was applicable
to manufacturing. But by no stretch of the imagination could dredging fall into the category of
manufacturing.
''The Company maintained that its operations
were so unitary that it was impossible, from its
books, to account specifically on its Mississippi
contracts. Yet, by its books, it had no difficulty
in so accounting to the State of Louisiana for its
income in that state.
"In bidding on a contract, it was of course
necessary for the Company to anticipate and take
into consideration all proper expenses and costs
in advance in making its bid so that it could insure
a profit. If this could be fairly done with reasonable certainty, assuredly the Company could keep
up with its receipts and expenses, and reasonably
determine, and have reflected in its books, the
profit or loss on each particular contract. The
auditors of the Tax Commission experienced no
insurmountable difficulty in ascertaining from the
books of the Company its receipts from each project together with expenses properly chargeable
thereto.
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"One serious trouble about the manner in
which the Company kept its books was that, although a substantial profit was shown on all the
contracts wholly or partly performed in Mississippi, yet, by insisting that it had the right to
charge to the Mississippi projects an unreasonable amount of the so-called ''idle shop account,"
it attempted to cancel out a large part of its l\Jississippi income. Since it had a number of other
projects, the Company was not entitled to attrihute to its Mississippi contracts an undue proportion of this account.
''The fact that such an over-all return on the
Company's business, so far as federal income
is concerned, might be proper or acceptable fur
that purpose is no reason why it should be applicable insofar as state income is concerned. If
the laws or conditions in this state were perhaps
more conducive to the earnings of profits than
elsewhere, nevertheless this should not haYc the
effect of penalizing this State by taking the income
earned here to replenish the Company's coffers
which had been exhausted by loss from profligate
or improvident contracts elsewhere.''
There is little or no justification in the record for the
facts asserted for the first time by plaintiff on pages 21
to 23 of its brief. As such they are not properly before
the court and must be disregarded in the determination
of this matter. Brandley Y. Lewis, 97 Utah 217, 92 P.
2d 338.
In this regard Section 59-13-46, U.C.A. 1953, provides
in part:

"Upon the hearing [in the Supreme Court] no
new or additional evidence may be introduced,

30

but the cause shall be heard upon the record before the tax commission as certified by it ... "
Under a statute very similar to 59-13-46, U.C.A.
1953, this court was faced with an attempt to supplement
the factual record in the case of Ferguson v. Industrial
Commission, 63 Utah 112, 221 Pac. 1099. It was there
stated:
''This court has frequently held that in certorari proceedings the record certified up by the
tribunal to whom the writ is directed imports absolute verity, and cannot be contradicted or supported by extrinsic evidence." 63 Utah 112, 114.
However, even if such facts ·were present and uncontested, the cases of McWilliams Dredging Co. v. McKe·igney, 227 l\Iiss. 730, 86 So. 2d 672, and Texas Co. v.
Cooper, 236 La. 380, 107 So. 2d 676, would appear to
to control.
Plaintiff has cited no cases holding that corporations engaged in the construction business in several
states are unitary in nature. The McvViUiams Dredging
Co. case, supra, holds they are not. The only justification for adopting the plaintiff's claim that it is a unitary
business entitled to use the apportionment formula is
if actual net income resulting to plaintiff from its Utah
operations cannot be determined.
That plaintiff incurs overhead expense in the overall administration of its business does not convert it into
a unitary business. The tax commission has allowed a
deduction for a portion of such expense.
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The fact remains that the plaintiff actually segrPga tes and separately accounts for its Utah income. It i~
absolutely necessary to the well-being of plaintiff's business that the separate values and amounts of property,
payrolls, sales and income in Utah be kept.
Not only does the plaintiff actually segregate arnl
separately account for its Utah income, but the Utah
apportionment formula requires a similar segregatio11
and separation. The formula should not obscure thl·
underlying purpose of the Utah Franchise Tax Act, i.e.,
to equate the value of the franchise to the net income
derived from Utah business operations.
POINT III
THE TAXPAYER IS ENTITLED TO DEDUCT
NO :l\fORE THAN THE PORTION OF FEDERAL TAXES PAID -WHICH PERTAINS TO
INCOME FROM ITS UTAH OPERATION~
AGAINST ITS UTAH I~COME FOR FRA;;1CHISE TAX PURPOSES.
The taxpa;"er claims that should the Court fincl the
statutory formula inapplicable to its operations so as to
require the reporting of gross income from Utah alone,
then it should be entitled to a deduction of projected federal taxes ·which it would ]m\"e paid had it only reported
the Utah income.

It seems perfectl_\" clear that the plaintiff can claim
no more deductions than those aetuall;" 1wid. Deduction~
are exemptions from taxation ancl ·where taxation is the
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rule exemption is the exception. Any statutes purporting
to establish exemptions from taxation must be strictly
construed against the taxpayer.
The statutes in question provide as follows:
59-13-3. "Every . . .corpora ti on, . . . for the
privilege of exercising its corporate franchise or
the privilege of doing business in the state, shall
annually pay to the state a tax equal to four per
cent of its net income for the preceding taxable
year computed and allocated to this state in the
manner hereinafter provided, ... ''
59-13-5 (1). " 'Gross income' includes gains,
profits and income derived from services, of whatever kind in whatever form paid, or from trades,
lmsinesses, commerce or sales, or dealings in
property, whether real or personal, growing out
of the O'Nnership or use of or interest in such
property; also from interest, rent, dividends or
securities or the transaction of any business carried on for gain or profit, or gains or profits and
income derived from any source whatever."
59-13-7. "In computing net income there shall
be allowed as deductions:
'' * * *
''Taxes Paid.
"(3) Taxes paid or accrued ·within the taxable
year, ... " (emphasis supplied.)
Thus it appears that to accept the taxpayer's position im-olves granting a greater deduction than that
allowed by the statute.
The tax commission, on the other hand, takes the position that the statutory deduction must be apportioned,
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m case of multi-state taxpayers, in accordance with th 0
relationship of income -within the State of Utah as c:ompared to income outside the state. The question arises,
therefore, as to what deduction exactly the statute doc,
allow.
The comm1ss1on has promulgated a regulation, No.
13, which was in effect during the period in co11troverRy,
which proYides in part:

"Allocation of Federal Iucome Taxes.
"(a) An assignment of a portion of the total allowable federal income tax deduction on the
Utah corporation franchise return may lie
required for certain purposes, such as arriYing at:
( 1) Income less 'related expense' which isubject to specific allocation under the
statute,

(2) Net income from various propertie8 i11
depletion computations, and
(3) Separate accounting determinations of
net income when authorized by the Utah
State Tax Commission under the provisions of sub-section ( 8) of sectio11
59-13-20 of the statute.

"(b) In general, the assignment of federal illcome taxes shall he made only to those seg·
ments of net income subject to federal
income tax and slrnll he made on the basis of
net income before federal taxes. Due collsidera tion must be giYen to segments of net
income subject to special federal tax tr~at
ment, such as domestic and foreign c11ndends, capital gains, etc.
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'' ( c) Federal income tax assignments are to be
made to profit-producing items or divisions
only. Each profit-producing item or division must be assigned its proportionate
share of the total allowable federal tax
deduction based on the ratio that the income of such profit-producing item or division bears to the total of all profit-producing items or divisions. Regardless of the
mechanics used, the total of the federal
tax assignments made against the profitproducing items or divisions, regardless of
where located or whether or not subject to
state income or franchise taxes, may not exceed the total corporate federal tax liability for the particular year involved, (in
case of an accrual basis taxpayer), or the
total amount paid (in the case of a cash
basis taxpayer).
The Utah State Tax Commission does
not recognize for Utah corporation franchise tax purposes the so-called 'tax-savings' resulting from loss items. 'Red-figure'
allocations of federal income taxes will not
be accepted. Loss items or divisions must
not be assigned any federal income tax
either positive or negative. Loss items or
divisions shall be appropriately treated in
effective tax rate determinations so as to
produce assignments of federal income tax
which are consonant with the requirements
set forth herein.''
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Generally, it has been assumed that an allocalJ/e2
portion of the federal taxes of a multi-state corporation
should be deducted from gross income in order to arrin
at usable "net income" under Utah law. See New Pad
Mining Co. v. State Tax Commission, 113 Utah 410, 1%
P. 2d 485; Kennecott Copper Co. v. State Tax Com 111 .,
118 Utah 140, 221 P. 2d 857.
To adopt the view advocated by the petitioner u1
even to allow the entire amount of federal taxes paicl ln
a multi-state taxpayer as a deduction against Utah nrt
income is to overturn the pattern of tax compliance established by the New Park Mining and Kennecott cases
and to promote new controversy and litigation. This
should not be done unless the tax commission's positio11
is untenable.
Research has disclosed fe,\· cases where this matter has arisen in other jurisdictions under similar statutory provisions.
Under a Kansas statute similar to our own a multistate corporation was held entitled to deduct from income
allocable to that state an applicable portion of taxes pairl
to the United States. The State Tax Commission had
ruled that the taxpayer was entitled to no deduction.
Apparently, no claim was made that the taxpayer was
2

Only an allocated portion of federal taxes was involved in the Kenneco~I
Copper case. See p. 10 of the defendant's brief, which indicates that fr·
era! taxes of Kennecott were allocated to Utah, and p. 6 of defendants
reply brief to plaintiff's petition for rehearing, wh!ch quotes Commm~i°
instructions then in force limiting federal tax dedumons to those apphca '
property in Utah.
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entitled to the entire deduction. Union Pac. R. Co. v.
State Tax Commission, 145 Kan. 715, 68 P. 2d 1.
The deductions allowed to a business which extends
into several states may be confined by statutes to those
expenses, losses, etc., which are related to income derived fom sources within the taxing state, where only
such income is subject to tax.

In the case of Buick Motor Co. v. Milwaukee, 48 F.
2d 801, affirming 43 F. 2d 385, cert. den., 284 U.S. 655,
52 S. Ct. 34, 76 L. Ed. 556, the taxpayer corporation sold
automobiles and parts manufactured by the General
Motors Company and was owned by the latter company.
The court held the corporation subject to a Wisconsin
income tax on the income from sales made through its
Wisconsin branch and further approved the practice of
the Wisconsin Tax Commission regarding the apportionment of the deduction on account of federal income
tax. In this case the General Motors Company and its
subsidiaries made a consolidated federal return, but the
Wisconsin Tax Commission allovved a deduction from
the Wisconsin tax of the proportion of the consolidated
federal tax as was attributable to Wisconsin business.
The company contended that it should be allowed to
deduct the same amount on account of federal income
tax as an independent dealer would have been entitled
to deduct, but this claim was rejected.
The Kansas income tax of a corporation engaged in
an interstate business was computed on the basis of an
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allocation to that state of a portion of the corporation\
total income, in U11ion Pacific: Railroad Cn. v. State Ta.1
Commission, 145 Kan. 715, 68 P. 2cl 1. 'There, the statutp
provided for an allocation when~ a direct allocation wn,
impractical. The court held that the mere fact that tlw
corporation received interest on i1n-estecl funds whid1
had no taxable situs in Kansas and so were excluded
from the total income, a portion of which was allocated to that state, clicl not make the interest paicl by it
on mortgages on property in Kansas and elsewhere a
related expense, but that an allocable pol'tion of the iuterest paid was deductible.
The tax commission's position is best justified 11;
the underlying purpose of the Franchise Tax Act. 111
onler that allocation can reach its final aim of net i11co111
to be assigned to the State of Utah it is first necessar;·
to assign items of deduction to items of gross incomP
arnl to allocate resulting net income or else to apportion items of deduction separately. This is \Yhat the tax
commission has done b)· separatel)· determining incomr
and thereafter apportioning dednetion items. The result
is true 11et income to Utah which our statutes manifestly
intend to ta:s:. To allow all federal taxes paid l1y the prtioner as a deduction is to not allocate or tax true ml
1

income to the petitioner in this state.
Deductions should be subject to the same geographi
1
cal limitations as the gross income included. If 0111.
income derived from sources \Yithin this state is taxolilc.
and this is the rule est a hlishcd hy ,:1 m ericau Inrrsf11u·id
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Co. v. State Taa; Commission, 101Utah189, 120 P. 2d 331,
337, then only items arising within the state should be
allowed as deductions if true net income is to be ascertained. See Altman & Keesling, Allocation of Income in
State Taxation, p. 177.
This argument is summarized by Atlman & Keesling
in their book, Alloca.tion of Income in State Taxation, p.
186, as follffws :
" ... [T]he portion of federal income taxes
which may be deducted is determined in most
states on the basis of net income ... where net income is used, the net income used is that of the
year covered by the federal tax for which deduction is sought. The determination is made by applying to the entire amount of federal taxes on
income a fraction, the numerator of which is the
net income within the scope of th estate tax and
the denominator of which is the net income shown
by the federal returns.''
As Tax Commission Regulation No. 13 achieves substantially the same result and as the purpose of the Franchise Tax Act is to tax net income attributable to Utah,
it would appear proper to disallow any deduction which
would tend to distort reportable true net income. No
double taxation results from a refusal to allow a deduction greater than that actually attributable to Utah
meome.
POINT IV
'I1HE QUESTION OF THE VALIDITY OF THE
AGREEMENT TO FILE ON A COMPLETED
CONTRACT BASIS USING SEGREGATED
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ACCOUNTING IS NOT PROPERLY BEFORE
THE COURT.
The question of the validity of the agreement (R.
17-18) between the taxpayer and the tax commission
was not raised before the tax commission in the proceeding below.

It has long been the law of this state that legal
questions cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
See Salt Lake Investment Co. v. Fox, 37 Utah 334, 108
Pac. 1132; In Re Jones Estate, 99 Utah 373, 104 P. 2d
210; Radley v. Smith, 6 Utah 2d 314, 313 P. 2d 465; Chief
Consolidated Jfining Co. v. Industrial Commission, 78
Utah 447, 4 P. 2d 1083.
Thus the question of whether or not this agreement
is binding on the plaintiff has no bearing upon the issue>
presented herein.
Plaintiff's contention m this regard is based primarily upon a claim that the tax commission has nn
power to enter into written agreements with taxpayers.
This question is also not before the court.

It must be noted that authorities cited in plaintiff's
brief on this point do not involve the present problem
where a taxpayer seeks to rescind an agreement which
has been relied upon by the state.
It has been held that agreements between taxpayen
and a state to pay taxes for which the taxpayer otherwise
might not lrn-rn been liable are enforceable if supporte!l
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hy sufficient consideration.

Cornrnonu;ealth ex rel. Dept.
of Justice v. Socony Vacuurn Oil Co., 347 Pa. 410, 32

A. 2d 631.

The contract in question involved the tax commission's release of a right to require filing and payment on
a percentage of completion basis in exchange for the taxpayer's promise to file and pay on a completed contract
zasis. The practical benefits of this agreement to the
taxpayer are apparent in that it is only required to subject its Utah income to taxation when ascertained and
received.
If the taxpayer desires to avoid the agreement, it

would seem better to merely serve notice of the tax commission that it wants to report on the percentage of completion or complete accrual basis. To change the basis
of reporting income after returns are filed is to invite
tax avoidance and create administrative hardship. It
should not be allo-wed without compelling reasons
therefor.
POINT V
THE ALLOCATION FORMULA PROVIDED
BY SECTION 59-13-20, U.C.A. 1953, DOES NOT
ALLOCATE INCOME FAIRLY AND EQUITABLY IN THE CASE OF CONTRACTORS.
The formula established in Section 59-13-20, U.C.A.
195:3, allocates income to the State of Utah on the basis
of a three factor formula. After certain specific treatments for capital gains or losses, rents, interest, and
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dividents, income attributable to the Utah activities of
a multi-state corporation iR determined 011 the basis ol
(1) tangible property, (2) salaries, wages aml commi.<.
sions, arnl (3) sales.
'1 he application of this formula contemplates a u11i
1

tary business operation within and without the Rtate ol
Utah, the operations of which are so inten1epem1ent and
related that incom(' from the Utah portion alone cmrnnt
be ascertained. The percentage resulting from thr
formula i8 then representative of the amount of lmsine"
done in any sta h>.
However, because of the ·wide possibility of Yariancr
of the formula factors, together with the unrelated irntmr
of separate contract projects, the formula does not result
in a reaRona ble or true detcrmina tiou of income in the
case of contractors.
In the tangible property fraction if all or most of
the equipment is rented on one contract but owned h,r tlir
corporation on another, in the formula for this pnrticn·
lar fraction no income \Yould be assig-necl to the eontrae~
which had the rented equipment hut woulcl all be a'·
signed to the contract wher0 the equipment \ms o,rned.

regardless of the earnings of each contract.
In the '"'age fraction, 011 one contract the labor may all
be subcontracted and the corporation have little or no
payroll for its O\Yn employc>c, and on another the per·
sonnel may all be employees of the corporation. The in·
come, of course, would then be weighted or allocated to
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the contract which used company employees and not to
!lie 011e which used subcontractors.
Arni in the sales fraction, sales, under Section
:i9-J :)-20 ( 6) ( c) are assigned to the office out of which
the taxpayer negotiates such sales. In the case of a contradiug corporation the sale or negotiation of a particular contract may or may not be accomplished in the
,ame state as the actual performance of such contract.
Iu plaintiff's case the sale or negotiation of the contract with Kennecott was out of the office located in
Sioux ( ~ity, lowa ancl therefore under the formula would
Hot he assigned to Utah.
From a hypothetical application of the above three
examples of the formula factors it can be seen that a
very profita hle contract (such as the one with Kennecott) could result in little or no net income allocated to
this state if the corporation owned no property or equipment (rented), paid no pages or salaries ( subcontractors), a11d assigned no sales (location of office) to Utah.
For these reasons the tax commission has establishc<l special regulations governing the allocation of income to contractors. The plaintiff filed its returns on
the basis of segregated accounting pursuant to its agreement with the tax commission in tacit recognition of
1lie inequities resulting, to state and taxpayer alike, from
<1 f'trict application of the formula.
The deficiency assessment against plaintiff is based
almost entirely upon the allocation of federal income tax
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to taxpayer's various profit items or income di,·ision,,
in and out of Utah as required by Corporation Fran.
chise Tax Regulation No. 13.
This regulation requires federal income tax to he
assigned against profit producing items or divisions on!)
Section 59-13-7(3), U.C.A. 1953, allows as a deduction
against gross income "taxes paid or accrued within tht·
taxable year.''
However, the plaintiff in filing its franchise tax re
turn assigned what was termed "federal income tax''
as an expense against its Utah income in the amount of
52 per cent of its Utah net income before tax. In other
words, it assigned $905,443.46 "federal income tax" to
its Utah net income, while the actual accrued federal income tax liability as computed in its federal return, after
investment credit, was $183,213.11.
Thus, while plaintiff only paid $183,215.11 actual fell·
er al taxes, it claims the right to deduct federal faxes ii
would o-we if it recei Yed $1,7 41,237.43 in income aml
did business in Utah alone.
The statute requires actual figures to be used in allo·
eating direct income, direct expenses and indirect ex·
penses. Actual figures should also be used in assignin~
federal taxes. Regulation 13 con templates an assigmnenl
of the actual federal tax to each profit item only to thr
extent it is subject to federal tax. As a result loss iteiw
are not assigned any federal tax.
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If f e<leral taxes are assigned against such loss items,
extreme inequities result to the taxing authority. This
can best he illustrated by the following two hypothetical
examples ·which "\vould not be allowed by Regulation 13:
Within Utah

Outside Utah

Total

Net contract
profit before
fed. tax -------- $2,000,000.00 $ (1,000,000.00) $1,000,000.00
Fed. tax@
52% (expense) __________ * 1,000,000.00
500,000.00) * 500,000.00
Net taxable
income __________ $1,000,000.00 $( 500,000.00) $ 500,000.00
•(Actual federal tax only $500,000.00.
fed tax.)

Utah assigned $1,000,000.00

If the plaintiff's position is carried to the extreme,
the following could o~ur:
Within Utah

Net contract profit
before fed. tax ______ $2,000,000.00
Fed. tax @52%
(approx.) ______________ 1,000,000.00
Net taxable income .. $1,000,000.00

Outside Utah

$ ( 2,000,000.00)

Total

-0-

( 1,000,000.00) "' -0(1,000,000.00)
-0-

~:__:__~~~~~~~-=---c~~---::~

==========================

•Actual federal income tax -0-, yet Utah assigned $1,000,000.00 federal
tax expense.

In the foregoing example Utah would be allocated
more than total net income, just as in fact plaintiff allocated more net income to Utah on its 1962 return than its
total for that year.

It is apparent from these examples that Utah income can be reduced by a nonexistent federal tax lia45

bility if plaintiff prevails herein. Such a result clearh
does not allocate to this state the proportion of net j11
come fairly and equitably attributable to the state an11
furnishes sufficient justification for the commission trJ
disregard the formula and make an allocation of incom1
under Section 59-13-20(8), U.C.A. Hl53.
CONCLUSION
The apportionment formula established by Sectio11
59-13-20, U.C.A. 1953, produces manifestly unfair result,
in this case. Plaintiff's income must be separately <letermined in order that it may be subjected to a proper
tax liability.
In any determination of this liability it is income
resulting from busineses transacted ·within the state
which is the measure of the value of plaintiff's franchise
Deductions from this income are allovvable only to the
extent authorized by law.
For these reasons the tax commission urges that it'
decision be upheld.
Respectfully submitted,
PHIL L. HANSEN
Attorney General
F. BURrl'ON HOW ARD
Assistant Attorney General
State Capitol
Salt Lake Ci.ty, Utah
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